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Of all the groups of migrants in the European Union, irregular migrants are the least 
welcome. The EU has adopted a panoply of measures to deter, detect and remove them. To 
keep them out, it has visa requirements and border controls, as well as laws on carrier 
sanctions and penalties for smugglers and traffickers. If they make it to the territory of a 
Member State, employers are prohibited from hiring them. Once detected, they must be 
expelled as soon as possible, and possibly detained on their way out. Many Member States 
have criminalised their entry and stay, and the EU bribes, cajoles and threatens non-EU 
states to make sure they are taken back. Once out, they usually face an entry ban, which is 
intended to make sure that they ever come back in. [footnotes for all]  
Yet despite all this, the Union’s policy on irregular migrants shows significant flashes of 
humanity almost despite itself. This in part due to the approach of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) to interpreting the EU’s Returns Directive – the main set of rules 
governing irregular migrants’ status on the Member States’ territory.  
The Returns Directive dates back to 2008;1 it took three years of difficult negotiations to 
agree.2 It was immediately widely criticised by NGOs and third States.3  The deadline to 
apply the Directive was Christmas Eve 2010.4 In 2014, the EU Commission reported on the 
implementation of the Directive by the Member States.5 The Directive has been a fertile 
sources of references to the CJEU, which has delivered over a dozen judgments on the 
Directive.6 Several more cases are pending.7   
                                                          
1 Dir 2008/115 ([2008] OJ L 348/98).  
2 See D Acosta, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in EU Migration Law’, 11 EJML (2009) 19, and the Statewatch 
analysis of June 2008: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jun/eu-analysis-returns-directive-june-2008-
final.pdf>.  
3 See Acosta, ibid, and A Baldaccini, ‘The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An Analysis 
of the Returns Directive’, 11 EJML (2009) 1. 
4 Art 20(1), Dir 2008/115; there was an extra year to apply the rules on legal aid. All the references in this 
paper are to the Returns Directive, unless otherwise indicated. 
5 COM (2014) 199, 28 March 2014.  
6 Cases: C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev [2009] ECR I-11189; C-61/11 PPU El Dridl  
[2011] ECR I-3015; C-329/11 Achughbabian [2011] ECR I-12695; C-430/11 Sagor ECLI:EU:C:2012:777; C-522/11 
Mbaye ECLI:EU:C:2013:190; C-534/11 Arslan ECLI:EU:C:2013:343; C-383/13 PPU G and R ECLI:EU:C:2013:533; 
C-297/12 Filev and Osmani ECLI:EU:C:2013:569; C-146/14 PPU Mahdi ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320; C-189/13 Da Silva 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2043; C-473/13 and C-514/13 Bouzalmate and Bero ECLI:EU:C:2014:2095; C-474/13 Pham 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2096; C-166/13 Mukarubega ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336; C-249/13 Boudjlida ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431; 
 Summary of the Returns Directive8 
The Directive applies to all third-country nationals ‘staying illegally’ in a Member State,9 
which is defined as a person who either ‘does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of 
entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code’ or who does not or no longer 
fulfils ‘other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State’.10 However, 
Member States may decide (optionally) not to apply the Returns Directive to persons who: 
a) were refused entry in accordance with the Schengen borders code, or who were 
‘apprehended or intercepted in connection with’ irregular crossing of an external border 
and who were not later allowed to stay in that Member State; or b) ‘are subject to a return 
as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to 
national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures’.11 But even if they apply the 
first of these exceptions (irregular entry), Member States must apply certain rules in the 
Directive,12 as well as the principle of non-refoulement.13 Furthermore, the Directive does 
not apply to persons with EU free movement rights.14  
The EU and Member States can have more favourable provisions for irregular migrants in 
agreement with third States or legislation. However, any more favourable rules set out in 
national legislation must be ‘compatible’ with the Directive.15 When implementing the 
Directive, Member States ‘shall take due account of’ the best interests of the child, family 
life, and the state of health of the persons concerned, and respect the principle of non-
refoulement.16  
The core of the Directive is an obligation for Member States to issue a ‘return decision’ to 
every third-country national staying illegally on their territory.17 However, this rule is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
C-562/13 Abdida ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453; C-38/14 Zaizoune ECLI:EU:C:2015:260; and C-554/13 Zh and O 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:377.  
7 Cases: C-290/14 Celaj (opinion of 28 April 2015) and C-47/15 Affum.  
8 This paper is partially adapted from the discussion of the Directive in the fourth edition of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs Law (OUP, forthcoming).  
9 Art 2(1).  
10 Art 3(2). The Schengen Borders Code is set out in Reg 562/2006 ([2006] OJ L 105/1).  
11 Art 2(2), referring in part to Art 13 of the Borders Code (ibid).  
12 Art 4(4). The provisions concerned are ‘Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 
9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1) (b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account 
needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions).’ 
13 Art 5, discussed further below.  
14 Art 2(3). See also the definition of ‘third-country national’ in Art 3(1).  
15 Art 4.  
16 Art 5. 
17 Art 6(1). Art 3(3) defines ‘return’: it can be either to a country of origin or transit, or to another third country 
which the person concerned chooses to return to and in which that person will be admitted. There is no 
definition of ‘third countries’. For the definition of ‘return decision’, see Art 3(4). 
‘without prejudice’ to a number of exceptions. First of all, a third-country national who 
holds a residence permit or other authorization to stay in a second Member State ‘shall be 
required to go’ back there instead; he or she would only be subject to a return decision in 
cases of non-compliance with the obligation to return to the second Member State or for 
reasons of ‘public policy or national security’.18 Next, a third-country national ‘may’ instead 
be sent to another Member State pursuant to a pre-existing bilateral deal, but in that case 
the second Member State ‘shall’ then issue a return decision to the person concerned.19  
Next, Member States have a very wide discretion to regularize stays of irregular migrants, 
‘at any moment…for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons’.20 In that case, no 
return decision shall be issued, but if a return decision has already been issued, Member 
States have the option of merely suspending the decision, rather than withdrawing it, for 
the duration of the authorized stay. Furthermore, Member States ‘shall consider refraining 
from issuing a return decision’ to persons whose applications for renewal of a permit to stay 
are pending, until that pending procedure is finished.21 As for the procedure, a return 
decision can be issued as a single act along with a decision terminating legal stay, a removal 
decision or an entry ban, subject to the relevant safeguards in the Directive and other EU 
and national rules.22  
As as general rule, irregular migrants must have the opportunity of voluntary departure. The 
basic principle is that a return decision must allow for a possible voluntary departure within 
a period of between 7 and 30 days, although the persons concerned are free to leave 
earlier.23 Also, this rule is subject to exceptions. On the one hand, Member States ‘shall, 
where necessary, extend the period for voluntary departure for an appropriate period’ in 
‘individual case[s]’, on grounds ‘such as’ family and social links, the length of stay, or 
children’s school attendance.24 On the other hand, if there is a risk of absconding,25 if an 
application for legal stay has been dismissed as ‘manifestly unfounded’ or fraudulent, or if 
‘the person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security’, 
Member States may refrain from permitting voluntary departure or grant a period shorter 
                                                          
18 Art 6(2).  
19 Art 6(3).  
20 Art 6(4).  
21 Art 6(5).  
22 Art 6(6); see also Art 8(3). For the definition of ‘removal’ and ‘entry ban’, see Art 3(5) and (6). 
23 Art 7(1).  
24 Art 7(2).  
25 For the definition of ‘risk of absconding’, see Art 3(7): the ‘existence of reasons in an individual case which 
are based on objective criteria defined by law to believe that a third-country national who is the subject of 
return procedures may abscond’.  
than seven days.26 Member States may impose obligations upon individuals during the 
period allowed for voluntary departure, to avoid the risk of absconding.27 
If an irregular migrant does not leave once the period for voluntary departure has expired, 
or if no such period has been granted, Member States are required in principle to remove 
them.28 A removal cannot be carried out while the period for voluntary departure has not 
yet expired, unless that period has been curtailed pursuant to the Directive.29 Any coercive 
measures must be used as a ‘last resort’, and must be ‘proportional’, ‘not exceed reasonable 
force’, and be in accordance with human rights and the dignity and physical integrity of the 
person concerned.30 When removing persons by air, Member States ‘shall take into account’ 
the common guidelines on security provisions for joint removals, attached to an earlier 
Council Decision on joint flights.31 In all cases, Member States ‘shall provide for an effective 
forced-return monitoring system’.32 
Member States are obliged to postpone removal where it would violate the principle of non-
refoulement, or where a suspensive effect of removal has been granted by a court (see 
below).33 Member States may postpone removal in other specific cases,34 and ‘shall in 
particular take into account’ the health of the person concerned or technical difficulties.  
The return or removal of unaccompanied minors is subject to specific safeguards.35 Before 
they are issued with a return decision, there must be assistance from bodies other than the 
return authorities, ‘with due consideration being given to the best interests of the child’.36 
National authorities ‘shall be satisfied that [the child] will be returned to a member of his or 
her family, a nominated guardian or adequate reception facilities in the State of return’ 
before a return is carried out.37  
Next, the Directive sets out rules on entry bans.38 An entry ban must be issued where a 
return decision was issued without a period for voluntary departure being granted, or 
where an obligation for return was not complied with.39 In other cases, an entry ban may be 
                                                          
26 Art 7(4).   
27 Art 7(3). 
28 Art 8(1). On the definition of ‘removal’, see Art 3(5).  
29 Art 8(2). 
30 Art 8(4). 
31 Art 8(5), referring to [2004] OJ L 261/28.  
32 Art 8(6). 
33 Art 9(1). 
34 Art 9(2).  
35 There is no definition of ‘unaccompanied minors’ (or ‘minors’) in the Directive. For the definition in other 
measures, see, for instance, Art 2(f) of the family reunion Dir (Dir 2003/86, [2003] OJ L 251/12).  
36 Art 10(1). See the discussion of this concept above. 
37 Art 10(2).  
38 Art 3(6) defines an ‘entry ban’ as a decision which applies to all the participating Member States. See also 
recital 18 in the preamble.  
39 Art 11(1).  
issued.40 The length of the entry ban must be based on ‘all relevant circumstances of the 
individual case’ and ‘shall not in principle exceed five years’, although longer bans are 
possible in cases of ‘serious threat to public policy, public health or national security’.41 
Member States ‘shall consider withdrawing or suspending’ an entry ban if the person 
concerned can demonstrate that he or she in fact left in compliance with a return decision.42 
They must not apply an entry ban to victims of trafficking in persons who have been granted 
a residence permit pursuant to Directive 2004/81, which concerns the immigration status of 
such victims,43 but this is ‘without prejudice’ to the obligation to issue an entry ban where 
an obligation to return was not complied with, and also subject to an exception on grounds 
of public policy, public security, or national security.44 Member States may refrain from 
issuing, or withdraw or suspend, an entry ban ‘in individual cases for humanitarian reasons’, 
and ‘may withdraw or suspend’ a ban ‘in individual cases or certain categories of cases for 
other reasons’.45 Also, if a Member State intends to issue a residence permit to a person 
who is subject to an entry ban issued by another Member State, the first Member State 
should first of all consult with the Member State that issued the entry ban according to the 
rules set out in the Schengen Convention.46  
Procedural safeguards for irregular migrants are set out in Chapter III of the Directive. 
Return decisions, removal decisions, and decisions on entry bans must be issued in writing 
and contain reasons in fact and law as well as information on remedies, although the 
obligation to give factual reasons can be limited by national law, ‘in particular in order to 
safeguard national security, defence, public security and for the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences.’47 Member States must translate the main 
elements of the decision upon request, including information on the available legal 
remedies, in a language which the person concerns understands or can be presumed to 
understand.48 As an exception, Member States can instead supply this information by using 
a standard form, rather than translating a decision, where persons have entered irregularly 
and have not subsequently obtained authorization to stay.49  
Irregular migrants must have an ‘effective remedy’ to appeal or review all types of decisions 
related to return before some sort of independent and impartial body, which could be (but 
                                                          
40 Ibid.  
41 Art 11(2). 
42 Art 11(3), first sub-paragraph. 
43 [2004] OJ L 261/19.  
44 Art 11(3), second sub-paragraph.  
45 Art 11(3), third and fourth sub-paragraphs.  
46 Art 11(4), referring to Art 25 of the Convention.  
47 Art 12(1).  
48 Art 12(2). 
49 Art 12(3). 
need not be) a judicial or administrative body.50 This entity must have the power to review 
the decisions related to return, including the power to suspend those decisions temporarily, 
unless such a power already exists in national law (ie because the legal challenge 
automatically suspends application of the decision concerned).51 The person concerned 
must also be able to obtain ‘legal advice, representation and, where necessary, linguistic 
assistance’.52 As for legal aid, this must be available subject to the same limitations provided 
for in the asylum procedures directive.53  
If an irregular migrant was given the chance to depart voluntarily, or if the implementation 
of a removal decision was postponed, there are safeguards.54 The migrants must be given 
written confirmation of their position, and Member States must ‘ensure that the following 
principles are taken into account as far as possible’, except where persons are in detention: 
family unity; emergency health care and essential treatment of illness; minors’ access to 
basic education; and ‘special needs of vulnerable persons are taken into account’.55  
Finally, the Directive addresses the controversial issue of immigration detention.56 Persons 
subject to return procedures ‘may only’ be detained ‘in order to prepare return and/or to 
carry out the removal process in particular when’ there is a risk of absconding or if the 
person concerned ‘avoids or hampers’ the return or removal process. Detention is only 
justified while removal arrangements ‘are in process and executed with due diligence’. It 
can be ordered by administrative or judicial authorities, and must be ‘ordered in writing 
with reasons in fact and law’. If the detention was ordered by administrative authorities, 
there must be some form of ‘speedy’ judicial review. There must be regular reviews of 
detention, either automatically or at the request of the person concerned. If there is no 
‘reasonable prospect of removal’ or the conditions for detention no longer exist, the person 
concerned must be released immediately. Conversely, detention shall be maintained as long 
as the conditions exist; this shall not exceed six months, except where national law permits 
a further period of up to one extra year because the removal operation is likely to last 
longer, due to lack of cooperation by the person concerned or delays in obtaining 
documentation.  
The rules on detention conditions address in turn: the place of detention (special facilities 
for migrants ‘as a rule’, separation from ordinary prisoners if detained in prison); the right to 
contact legal representatives, family members and consular authorities; the situation of 
vulnerable persons; the possibility for independent bodies to visit detention facilities; and 
                                                          
50 Art 13(1). 
51 Art 13(2). 
52 Art 13(3). 
53 Art 13(4).  
54 Art 14. 
55 The definition of ‘vulnerable persons’ is set out in Art 3(9). 
56 Art 15. 
information to be given to migrants.57 There are more detailed rules on the detention of 
minors and families,58 although Member States may derogate from certain aspects of the 




Broadly speaking, the CJEU case law on this Directive has tried to balance humane 
treatment of irregular migrants with the underlying objective of removing the irregular 
migrants as soon as possible. There are obvious contradictions in these two approaches, 
however, and so in some cases the CJEU has had to choose squarely between one or the 
other, or has only been able to reconcile them up to a point.  
One example of choosing efficiency over humanity is the Court’s ruling in Zaizoune,60 the 
first judgment clarifying Member States’ powers to set ‘more favourable conditions’ if they 
are ‘compatible’ with the Directive. Irregular migrants would obviously benefit if Member 
States simply tolerated their residence, rather than attempted to expel them (and 
potentially use detention and coercion to this end). In practice, Spain did not expel all 
irregular migrants, but chose to fine some of them instead. However, the CJEU ruled that 
this went beyond Member States’ power of discretion to set more favourable conditions for 
irregular migrants, since it contradicted the basic objective of securing removal, 
contradicted the rules in the Directive obliging Member States to issue a return order and 
carry out a removal, and would ‘thwart’ common standards and ‘delay’ return.  
The Court emphasized that none of the exceptions to the basic rule requiring removal 
applied in this case; so Member States still retain the power to regularise an irregular 
migrant’s status at any time, and can always use this route to improve their status formally 
if they wish to. Since the main focus of the Court’s judgment in Zaizoune (consistently with 
much of the other case law on the Directive, for instance as regards custodial penalties 
delaying removal) concerns the effective issue and enforcement of a return order, 
presumably the ‘compatibility’ rule applies only in that particular context, not to the other 
aspects of the Directive. 
Another important batch of cases concerns criminalisation of irregular migration. If irregular 
migration is a crime punishable in practice by a custodial sentence, that means that the 
safeguards relating to the grounds for and conditions (detention standards, judicial review, 
time limits) of immigration detention in the Directive are avoided altogether. Alternatively it 
                                                          
57 Art 16. 
58 Art 17. 
59 Art 18. 
60 N. 6 above.  
is possible that the immigration detention will be imposed on top of (ie before or after) the 
custodial penalties, lengthening the overall period of detention for the mere entry or stay 
into a territory without authorisation.  
However, the possibility of imposing custodial penalties as a criminal sanction for irregular 
migration has been all but abolished by the CJEU, in a remarkable series of judgments that 
are not based on the wording of the Directive, but on the EU law principle of effectiveness. 
In part, this case law concerns the scope of the Directive. Given that it does apply to 
irregular migrants whose expulsion is the consequence of a criminal penalty, are all irregular 
migrants who have breached national criminal law by committing ‘immigration offences’ 
exempt from it?  
The CJEU began to answer this question in El Dridl,61 stating that the removal order issued to 
the irregular migrant in that case had been issued separately from the criminal offence of 
irregular entry, and so the criminal law exception from the scope of the Directive did not 
apply.62 Secondly, and more broadly, it ruled in Achughbabian that the criminal law 
exclusion did not apply to any cases where a criminal penalty was imposed only for irregular 
entry.63 Logically this reasoning equally applies to cases where a criminal penalty is imposed 
for irregular stay or breach of an entry ban, and the CJEU has been asked to confirm this 
interpretation in Celaj.64  
So irregular migrants who have committed ‘immigration offences’ fall within the scope of 
the Directive. The Court of Justice has taken the further step since the El Dridl judgment of 
asserting that imposing a custodial penalty for a criminal offence of breaching immigration 
law undermines the effectiveness of the Directive, since it delays in practice the execution 
of the removal of the individual concerned. In the Court’s view, the Directive establishes a 
system of gradually increasing sanctions upon the individuals concerned, giving them first an 
opportunity for voluntary departure in principle (more on that below) with immigration 
detention only as a last resort. A custodial penalty for a criminal offence would delay that 
process.  
However, the subsequent Achughbabian judgment clarified that irregular migrants could be 
detained for a brief period when initially questioned by the police, and possibly subjected to 
a form of custodial sentence for irregular migration if the expulsion process did not work 
out.65 More precisely, the Directive ‘does not preclude penal sanctions being imposed, 
following national rules of criminal procedure, on third-country nationals to whom the 
return procedure established by [the] directive has been applied and who are illegally 
staying in the territory of a Member State without there being any justified ground for 
                                                          
61 N. 6 above.  
62 This was reaffirmed in the order in Mbaye (ibid). 
63 Ibid. This was also reaffirmed in the order in Mbaye (ibid). 
64 The Advocate-General’s opinion in this pending case (n 7 above) supports this interpretation.  
65 N. 6 above.  
non-return’.  The latest word from the Court on this point (Sagor) clarifies that criminal 
sanctions for irregular migration can be imposed in the form of fines, but not (following the 
logic of the prior judgments) home detention, since that would delay the implementation of 
the process of removal.66 
So custodial penalties (or home detention) for irregular migration before or instead of the 
immigration detention provided for by that Directive are ruled out. Such penalties are only 
admitted after the return process has been applied, if there is no ‘justified ground for non-
return’. The latter concept has not yet been clarified by the Court, but it suggests that if 
there is a justified ground for postponement of the return, as set out in the Directive, 
custodial penalties still cannot be applied. While the overall thrust of the Directive remains, 
according to this case law, the guarantee of removal of the individual concerned, the rulings 
make it less likely that the irregular migrant will be detained at all (due to the preference for 
voluntary departure) and ensure that he or she will not normally be kept in prisons, along 
with other key detention standards.  
The importance of the Court’s rulings was strengthened, when it was first due for 
transposition, by its findings that the Directive applied to those already detained as of the 
initial transposition date (Kadzoev).67 This judgment also clarified the rules on time limits for 
detention, holding that there is a ‘reasonable prospect of removal’, the Court ruled that this 
criterion for releasing the person concerned is irrelevant where the time limits on detention 
have in any event expired. Where the criterion does apply, it means that a ‘real prospect 
exists that the removal can be carried out successfully, having regard to’ the relevant time 
limits, and that this prospect ‘does not exist where it appears unlikely that the person 
concerned will be admitted to a third country, having regard to’ those time limits. 68 The 
Court also ruled that Member States could not keep a person in immigration detention, 
once the relevant time limit had expired, merely because the person concerned does not 
possess valid documents, his conduct is aggressive, and he has no financial support or 
accommodation. Moreover, the Court has upheld basic standards of judicial review of 
immigration detention.69  
A key question about the humane treatment of the persons concerned is what happens 
during detention. In Bero and Pham,70 the Court ruled out Member States’ arguments that 
Member States with a federal system could evade the rules requiring immigration detainees 
to be kept out of prison as a normal rule by arguing that some of the federal entitles did not 
have immigration detention centres. If necessary, the sub-federal administrations have to 
cooperate to ensure that the rules are properly applied. The Court also ruled out in Pham 
                                                          
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. See also Filev and Osmani (ibid) as regards the temporal scope of the Directive’s rules on entry bans.  
68 Paras 65 and 66 of the judgment, ibid. 
69 The Court has also been asked to confirm whether the principles apply to irregular migrants in transit (see 
Affum, pending, n. 7 above).  
70 N. 6 above.  
the possibility that an irregular migrant might waiver the protections as regards prisons, 
rightly considering (as the Advocate-General had argued) that a detainee had little genuine 
autonomy to resist pressure for such a waiver from the national administration.  
These judgments do not apply to asylum-seekers unless their asylum application has 
definitively failed. In light of the references to immigration detention issues in the EU’s 
asylum legislation, and the preamble to the Returns Directive which states that in 
accordance with the EU’s asylum procedures Directive,71 a third-country national asylum-
seeker ‘should not be regarded as staying illegally on the territory of that Member State 
until a negative decision on the application, or a decision ending his or her right of stay as 
asylum seeker has entered into force’.72 So the CJEU decided that asylum-seekers fall 
outside the scope of the Directive.73 Subsequently, the Court elaborated in Arslan that the 
same rule applied even if the migrant applied for asylum while already detained, given that 
the EU’s asylum procedures Directive had special rules dealing with asylum applicants in 
that position.74  
Moreover, the Court has made it harder for irregular migrants to be detained in the first 
place, by means of its judgments on the scope of the obligation to grant voluntary 
departure. This obligation implicitly determines not only whether the migrant will be 
detained, and necessarily determines whether his or her removal will be coerced. If no 
voluntary departure is granted, then in principle the migrant must be subject to an entry 
ban, and does not have access to minimum standards of treatment. First of all, the Court 
has confirmed that the grounds for refusing such an opportunity, limiting the period, or 
imposing obligations during that period are exhaustive.75 
Secondly, the Court has ruled that the purpose of the voluntary departure period is to 
secure the fundamental rights of the migrant, and it follows that the exceptions from the 
rule have to be interpreted strictly (Zh and O). Two of these exceptions have been clarified 
by the CJEU: the risk of absconding (in Mahdi)76 and the public policy exception (in Zh and 
O). In Mahdi, the Court ruled that any assessment of the risk of absconding has to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis, based on objective criteria. It breaches the Directive to 
detain someone on that basis purely because they do not have identity documents, without 
considering whether a less coercive measure could be applied.  
                                                          
71 Art 7 of Dir 2005/85, [2005] OJ L 326/13.  
72 Recital 9 in the preamble.  
73 Kadzoev, n 6 above.  
74 Ibid. The Court also referred to the plans to adopt more detailed rules on detention in the second-phase 
asylum legislation, which has since been adopted (for instance, Arts 8-11, Directive 2013/33, [2013] OJ L 
180/96).  
75 El Dridl, para 37, confirmed in Zh and O (n. 6 above).  
76 Paras 65-73 of that judgment. Mahdi (ibid) concerned the grounds for detention in Art 15, but there is no 
reason to assume that ‘risk of absconding’ has a different meaning for the purposes of Art 7. 
As for the public policy exception, the CJEU ruled in Zh and O that it should be interpreted 
‘by analogy’ with the similar provisions of EU free movement law. It is up to the Member 
State to ‘prove’ the risk to public policy, and while Member States ‘retain the freedom’ to 
decide on the concept of public policy, they do not have full latitude to determine the 
concept without any control by the Court. The exception has to be applied on a ‘case-by-
case basis’, to decide if the ‘personal conduct’ of the migrant ‘poses a genuine and present 
risk to public policy’. This means the suspicion of committing a criminal act, or even a 
criminal conviction, cannot by itself justify the conclusion that a ‘public policy’ risk exists. 
However, it is possible that the ‘public policy’ exception could still apply where an appeal 
against a criminal conviction has not yet been decided, or where there is no conviction, as 
long as ‘other factors’ justified the use of that exception. Those other factors include the 
‘nature and seriousness’ of the act and ‘the time which has elapsed since it was committed’. 
So the national court had to consider that in one case, the migrant was actually not trying to 
stay in the Netherlands without authorisation, but was on his way out (travelling to Canada) 
when he was stopped. In the other case, the migrant had been accused of domestic abuse, 
but it was relevant that there was nothing to substantiate that accusation. 
The Court’s liberal approach to the voluntary departure rules, like its liberal approach to the 
grounds for and conditions of detention, detention time limits and judicial review and 
criminalisation of irregular migration, does not exempt migrants from the ultimate 
obligation to return. Indeed, to some extent, at least as regard the limits on criminalisation 
of irregular migration, the whole point is to make that underlying obligation more effective. 
But are there any circumstances where the Directive prevents migrants from being returned 
at all?  
Remarkably, there are. In its Abdida judgment,77 concerning a terminally ill irregular migrant 
who needed access to health care, the CJEU confirmed that at least the non-refoulement 
clause in Article 5 of the Directive prevented the enforcement of a return decision. 
Moreover, the Court interpreted this provision of the Directive consistently with Article 
19(2) of the EU Charter, and in turn interpreted the Charter provision in line with the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. That line of jurisprudence, interpreting the ban 
on torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment set out in Article 3 ECHR, does not 
permit migrants to stay in a country to obtain social or medical assistance as a general rule. 
But as the CJEU points out, the other Court’s case law provides that ‘a decision to remove a 
foreign national suffering from a serious physical or mental illness to a country where the 
facilities for the treatment of the illness are inferior to those available in that State may 
raise an issue under Article 3 ECHR in very exceptional cases, where the humanitarian 
grounds against removal are compelling’. It should be noted that this rule covers people 
                                                          
77 N. 6 above.  
who are not entitled to international protection (refugee or subsidiary protection status) 
under EU asylum legislation.78  
It remains to be seen how the CJEU will interpret the other grounds which Member States 
must take account of (best interests of the child, family life, and state of health), although 
the case law on the effect of similar general provisions in the EU’s family reunion Directive 
suggests prima facie that these provisions of the Returns Directive should have a 
comparable strong legal impact.79 These are the only express substantive grounds for 
objecting to an expulsion set out in the Directive. However, it should not be forgotten that 
any substantive grounds for resisting expulsion set out in other EU legislation, national 
legislation, or international treaties will take priority over the Returns Directive anyway.80 
Finally, it should be noted that the substantive rule is accompanied by a procedural 
safeguard: the CJEU ruled in Boudjlida that the right to a hearing on the expulsion decision 
encompasses an obligation to consider all of the arguments that the migrant might as 
regards the various considerations that Member States have to take into account. 81 
The CJEU went to rule that the ban on Mr. Abdida’s removal had the consequential effect 
that the remedy against removal had to be suspensive, despite the optional wording of the 
Directive on this point, because otherwise Mr. Abdida could suffer irreparable harm if sent 
back to his country of origin before his appeal was decided.    
 
Next, the CJEU ruled on his social rights. As we have seen, if irregular migrants are given a 
time for voluntary departure or their removal is postponed, Member States must ‘ensure 
that the following principles are taken into account as far as possible…’: family unity, 
emergency health care and essential treatment of illness, minors’ access to the basic 
education system and the special needs of vulnerable persons. 
 
In the Court’s view, Mr. Abdida qualified for this treatment because his removal had to be 
postponed under the Directive, which requires postponement where suspensive effect of an 
appeal has been granted. Oddly, the Court did not mention that the Directive also requires 
postponement where removal would violate the principle of non-refoulement, although this 
rule was obviously relevant to Mr. Abdida as well. Moreover, the Court ruled that Mr. 
Abdida’s was also entitled to social assistance , even though such assistance is not 
mentioned as a right for those whose removal is postponed at all. Indeed, the preamble to 
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the Directive states that pending return, the ‘basic conditions of subsistence should be 
defined according to national legislation’. But the CJEU ruled that such legislation still had to 
be ‘compatible with the requirements laid down in’ the Directive. In this case, the right to 
the provision of health care would be ‘rendered meaningless if there were not also a 
concomitant requirement to make provision for the basic needs’ of the person concerned. 
However, that right only had to be provided ‘as far as possible’, on the condition that the 
person lacked the means to provide for his own needs; and it was up to Member States to 
‘to determine the form’ which the provision of basic needs took. 
Finally, the impact of the Abdida case should be qualified by comparing it to other cases 
where irregular migrants are in ‘limbo’. There should be fewer such cases in light of 
Zaizoune, since that judgment makes clear that Member States cannot just tolerate an 
irregular migrant on their territory: they must either issue and then enforce a return 
decision, or regularise the person concerned. However, there may still be limbo cases in 
practice, either because Member States do not actually comply with the basic obligation to 
issue a return decision and attempt to enforce it, or because despite their best efforts, the 
removal has to be postponed or can never be carried out. The Directive does not set a final 
end point when a Member State has to give up trying to remove an irregular migrant and 
give him or her a more formal legal status, as the CJEU confirmed in Mahdi. Rather all that 
must be granted in such cases are the very basic social rights set out for postponement 
cases (which apply once any detention has ended).  
While these rights do not expressly extend to social assistance, we have seen that in Abdida 
the Court will be willing to infer the existence of an implied right to such support, at least as 
a corollary of health care. Arguably the implied right to social assistance can apply in other 
cases of postponement, given that social assistance and housing are obviously necessary to 
avoid the irregular migrant becoming seriously ill in the first place.  There will likely be no 
prospect that the irregular migrant can work legally as an alternative method of earning an 
income, since a separate Directive requires Member States to prohibit irregular migrants 
from employment in principle, although Member States do have an option to allow them to 
work where their removal has been postponed.  
Conclusions  
As we have seen, the Returns Directive has not, as originally forecast, functioned solely as a 
mechanism for detaining and removing irregular migrants as harshly as possible. This is 
largely due to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, which has consistently tried to strike a balance 
between securing the humanity and individual rights of irregular migrants and ensuring their 
effective removal. Of course, as noted at the outset, these two principles of interpretation 
are uneasy bedfellows. In some cases the CJEU gives preference squarely to effective 
removal: Zaizoune sets a ceiling on Member States’ compassion toward irregular migrants, 
unless they are prepared to go as far as to regularise migrants’ position formally. But in 
contrast, there are cases which give clear preference to humanity: Abdida, which performs 
several feats of legal alchemy by using the Directive as a means to resist removal, and also 
overrules the clear wording of the Directive as regards the non-suspensive effect of the 
challenge to expulsion and the lack of access to social assistance.  
More frequently, the case law attempts to marry the two principles, for instance by 
preferring immigration detention to custodial penalties, and by trying to ensure that time in 
detention is subject to better standards than in prisons. This is only a modest amelioration 
of the underlying obligation to leave; and in most cases, the CJEU is not willing to do 
anything to improve the position of those who cannot in practice be removed. Ultimately, 
there are inevitable limits to any attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole.  
 
 
 
 
